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This	  paper	  aims	  to	  investigate	  the	  firm	  level	  effects	  from	  the	  removal	  of	  trade	  barriers.	  It	  uses	  firm	  
level	  data	  on	  Indian	  firms,	  and	  employs	  simple	  but	  effective	  specifications	  aimed	  to	  analyze	  the	  
differential	  effects	  in	  sales	  and	  prices	  of	  goods	  previously	  quota	  bound	  compared	  to	  unbound	  
products.	  Findings	  are	  consistent	  with	  quota	  theory	  and	  are	  robust.	  Estimates	  show	  a	  20%	  increase	  
in	  sales	  value	  of	  previously	  quota	  restricted	  products,	  post	  2005,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  5%	  decrease	  in	  prices.	  	  
In	  addition	  a	  significant	  contribution	  to	  firm	  level	  data	  analysis	  and	  compilation	  is	  made.	  1	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1. Introduction	  	  
	  
Empirical	  research	  has	  documented	  substantial	  increases	  in	  productivity	  and	  income	  as	  a	  result	  of	  
trade	  liberalization	  (Pavicnik	  2002,	  Feyrer	  2010	  and	  Khandelwal	  et	  al	  2008).	  However	  there	  is	  limited	  
empirical	  research	  into	  the	  behavior	  of	  firms	  as	  a	  result	  of	  trade	  barrier	  removal.	  This	  paper	  aims	  to	  
investigate	  the	  influence	  that	  trade	  barrier	  removal	  has	  on	  firm	  dynamics.	  This	  study	  is	  motivated	  by	  
the	  need	  to	  gain	  understanding	  of	  firm	  dynamics,	  within	  large	  developing	  country	  firms,	  and	  the	  
specific	  effect	  trade	  liberalization	  has	  on	  firms’	  product	  choice,	  sales	  and	  prices	  after	  a	  quota	  
restriction	  is	  removed.	  	  
	  
January	  2005	  saw	  the	  complete	  removal	  of	  the	  final	  phase	  of	  textile	  and	  clothing	  quota	  
restrictions,	  regulated	  by	  the	  Agreement	  on	  Textile	  and	  Clothing	  (ATC),	  which	  is	  the	  successor	  to	  the	  
Multi-­‐Fiber	  Agreement	  (MFA).	  The	  road	  to	  liberalization	  under	  the	  ATC	  saw	  the	  gradual	  relaxation	  of	  
quota	  restrictions	  on	  India	  and	  other	  developing	  countries	  textile	  and	  clothing	  producers,	  over	  the	  
period	  1995	  –	  2005.	  The	  phase	  out	  period	  sparked	  export	  and	  production	  surges	  throughout	  
Southern	  Asia,	  with	  further	  increases	  in	  sales	  volumes	  post	  2005.	  This	  is	  well	  documented	  at	  the	  
industry	  or	  macroeconomic	  level;	  however	  there	  is	  limited	  insight	  into	  the	  firm	  level	  effects	  of	  such	  
quota	  restriction	  removal-­‐	  especially	  for	  firms	  in	  large	  developing	  countries.	  
	  
There	  has	  been	  interesting	  and	  significant	  results	  indicating	  the	  growth	  and	  competitive	  
market	  alignments	  experienced	  by	  Indian	  manufacturing	  firms.	  (Chaudhary	  2011,	  Tewari	  2005	  and	  
Chiron	  2004).	  Research	  emphasizes	  growth	  being	  endogenous	  to	  the	  firm	  and	  not	  necessarily	  the	  
policy	  which	  has	  ended	  and	  although	  intuitive	  and	  empirically	  robust,	  it	  lacks	  specific	  insight	  into	  
inter	  and	  intra	  firm	  dynamics.	  However	  there	  is	  no	  argument	  against	  the	  clear	  findings	  of	  increased	  
integration	  being	  a	  catalyst	  for	  further	  export	  growth.	  Previous	  studies	  however,	  emphasize	  that	  
factor	  endowments,	  market	  structure	  and	  competitive	  firms	  were	  in	  place	  in	  India	  at	  the	  time	  of	  
policy	  change	  in	  2005,	  and	  that	  may	  be	  a	  significant	  contributing	  factor	  to	  the	  realized	  growth	  and	  
success	  in	  the	  textile	  and	  apparel	  economies	  being	  documented.	  (Chaudhary	  2005).	  Such	  analysis	  
has	  been	  conducted	  only	  at	  the	  industry	  level,	  and	  therefore	  further	  insight	  into	  Indian	  firm	  
dynamics	  will	  aim	  to	  provide	  an	  interesting	  contribution	  to	  previous	  aggregate	  level	  studies.	  As	  well	  
as	  providing	  a	  significant	  contribution	  of	  data	  analysis	  and	  compilation,	  which	  has	  been	  the	  primary	  
factor	  hindering	  insight	  into	  firms	  product	  choices	  and	  dynamics	  across	  sales	  and	  prices	  of	  goods.	  	  	  
	  
A	  firm	  level	  database,	  compiled	  by	  The	  Centre	  for	  Monitoring	  the	  Indian	  Economy	  (CMIE),	  
provides	  a	  significant	  degree	  of	  firm	  level	  detail,	  and	  allows	  for	  a	  comprehensive	  analysis	  of	  firm	  
responses	  (across	  product	  choices,	  pricing	  and	  sales)	  to	  trade	  barrier	  removal.	  This	  paper	  employs	  
basic	  specifications2	  that	  aim	  to	  decompose	  the	  differential	  effects	  of	  sales	  between	  previously	  
bound	  and	  unbound	  products	  after	  the	  MFA	  removal.	  It	  confirms	  the	  findings	  of	  surges	  in	  sales	  after	  
20053	  on	  an	  aggregate	  level,	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  provides	  sales	  volume	  and	  price	  effect	  changes	  
that	  are	  consistent	  with	  applied	  trade	  theory.	  Key	  findings	  are	  concentrated	  around	  the	  effects	  on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Worked	  off	  a	  framework	  used	  in	  Brambilla,	  Khandelwal	  and	  Schott	  2007.	  	  
3	  Emphasized	  by	  authors	  such	  as	  Chiron	  (2004),	  Chaudhary	  (2011),	  Tewari	  (2005)	  and	  Brambilla,	  Khandelwal	  












sales	  and	  prices	  of	  previously	  bound	  products	  under	  the	  MFA.	  Depending	  on	  the	  specification,	  we	  
find	  that	  the	  sales	  for	  firms	  producing	  a	  previously	  quota	  bound	  product,	  increased	  by	  roughly	  20%	  
compared	  to	  when	  quotas	  were	  still	  in	  place.	  Secondly,	  and	  also	  depending	  on	  specifications,	  we	  
find	  a	  decrease	  in	  prices	  of	  previously	  bound	  products	  by	  roughly	  8%	  after	  the	  quota	  system	  was	  
dropped.	  Key	  findings	  are	  consistent	  with	  what	  trade	  theory	  suggests,	  with	  decreases	  in	  the	  prices	  of	  
previously	  quota	  bound	  products,	  and	  a	  surge	  in	  sales	  post	  quota	  removal.	  There	  is	  also	  logical	  
insight	  into	  how	  the	  quota	  system	  sheltered	  domestic	  firms	  of	  the	  importing	  country	  from	  global	  
competition,	  specifically	  from	  large	  developing	  textile	  manufacturers	  such	  as	  India.	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
This	  paper	  makes	  a	  significant	  contribution	  to	  the	  compilation	  and	  analysis	  of	  firm	  level	  data	  
accessed	  from	  CMIE.	  It	  required	  substantial	  research	  into	  the	  structure	  of	  reporting	  across	  firms	  and	  
products	  and	  provides	  insight	  into	  different	  quota	  mapping	  techniques.	  	  Although	  this	  paper	  
maintains	  a	  simple	  structured	  approach,	  the	  opportunity	  for	  future	  and	  more	  detailed	  studies	  is	  
large.	  	  
	  
Therefore	  in	  summary	  a	  structured,	  systematic	  approach	  is	  taken	  to	  empirically	  test	  two	  
basic	  hypotheses.	  Firstly	  did	  the	  removal	  of	  the	  MFA	  boost	  sales	  and	  exports	  of	  previously	  quota	  
restricted	  products,	  compared	  to	  un-­‐quota	  restricted	  products?	  Secondly	  did	  the	  removal	  of	  the	  
MFA	  reduce	  prices	  of	  previously	  quota	  restricted	  products	  relative	  to	  the	  unbound	  products?	  	  
	  
The	  remainder	  of	  the	  paper	  will	  be	  structured	  as	  follows:	  	  section	  two	  will	  provide	  a	  background	  to	  
the	  MFA	  and	  ATC,	  as	  well	  as	  providing	  a	  brief	  literature	  review.	  Section	  three	  will	  provide	  a	  
theoretical	  overview.	  Section	  four	  provides	  empirical	  specifications	  as	  well	  as	  data	  compilation	  
methods.	  Section	  five	  provides	  estimation	  results	  and	  section	  six	  concluding	  remarks.	  	  	  
	  
2.1 Background	  to	  the	  MFA	  and	  ATC	  
	  
The	  Multifiber	  Arrangement	  (MFA)	  began	  in	  1974	  as	  a	  result	  of	  developed	  countries	  seeking	  a	  more	  
systematic	  mechanism	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  continued	  growth	  of	  textile	  and	  clothing	  imports	  from	  Asian	  
countries.	  The	  MFA	  stemmed	  off	  a	  long	  series	  of	  voluntary	  export	  restraints	  imposed	  in	  the	  early	  
1950’s.	  (Khandelwal	  et	  al	  2007)	  
The	  aim	  of	  the	  Agreement	  on	  Textile	  and	  Clothing	  (ATC)	  was	  to	  start	  the	  phasing	  out	  process	  
of	  the	  MFA	  and	  start	  the	  gradual	  integration	  of	  textile	  and	  clothing	  products	  into	  the	  GATT/WTO	  
rules.	  	  The	  ATC	  was	  split	  into	  four	  distinct	  quota	  relaxation	  phases,	  and	  within	  each	  phase	  each	  
importing	  country	  was	  required	  to	  relax	  quotas	  in	  ‘product	  sets’.	  The	  integrating	  process	  was	  subject	  
to	  two	  rules;	  firstly	  the	  quotas	  relaxed	  in	  each	  phase	  had	  to	  be	  from	  each	  of	  the	  four	  major	  textile	  
groups	  –	  yarn,	  fabrics,	  made-­‐ups	  and	  clothing.	  And	  each	  set	  of	  chosen	  products	  had	  to	  represent	  a	  
certain	  proportion	  of	  the	  respective	  countries	  1990	  textile	  and	  clothing	  exports	  (Khandelwal	  et	  al	  
2007).	  The	  gradual	  removal	  of	  quotas	  allowed	  for	  the	  improved	  access	  to	  developed	  markets	  for	  
producers	  such	  as	  India.	  By	  2005	  East	  Asian	  products,	  excluding	  China,	  were	  fully	  integrated.	  China	  
remained	  restricted	  to	  a	  certain	  degree	  due	  to	  its	  exclusion	  from	  the	  WTO	  prior	  to	  2001	  and	  












restricted	  by	  the	  U.S.	  on	  certain	  products,	  up	  until	  2008,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  U.S.	  domestic	  producer	  
lobbying.	  (Khandelwal	  et	  al	  2007).	  	  
The	  U.S	  Office	  of	  Textile	  and	  Apparel	  (OTEXA)	  monitored	  trading	  partners’	  compliance	  with	  
the	  MFA	  and	  ATC	  quotas.	  OTEXA	  makes	  use	  of	  U.S.	  partners	  expired	  performance	  reports.	  The	  
expired	  performance	  reports	  list	  quota	  categories,	  along	  with	  products	  that	  fall	  into	  these	  categories	  
–	  at	  the	  HS	  10	  digit	  level	  and	  the	  respective	  quota	  restriction	  and	  the	  fill	  rate	  of	  the	  quota	  category.	  	  
The	  database	  covers	  1984	  to	  2004	  and	  provides	  sufficient	  quota	  restrictiveness	  information	  to	  carry	  
out	  this	  study.	  	  
	  
The	  structure	  of	  the	  quota	  reports	  consisted	  of	  149	  quota	  categories,	  each	  represented	  by	  a	  
three	  digit	  code.	  Each	  3	  digit	  coded	  category	  incorporated	  further	  disaggregated	  categories.	  The	  five	  
main	  categories	  were	  cotton	  and/or	  manmade	  fiber,	  cotton	  fabrics,	  wool,	  man-­‐made	  fiber,	  synthetic	  
materials	  and	  of	  silk	  blends	  or	  non-­‐cotton	  vegetable	  fibers.	  Under	  each	  of	  these	  five	  categories	  there	  
are	  varying	  amounts	  of	  three	  digit	  categories.	  Within	  each	  three	  digit	  category	  there	  are	  an	  average	  
of	  seventeen	  products	  reported	  at	  the	  HS	  10	  level.	  (Khandelwal	  et	  al	  2007).The	  basic	  structure	  was	  
as	  follows:	  
• Five	  broad	  textile	  or	  clothing	  categories:	  cotton	  and/or	  manmade	  fiber,	  cotton	  
fabrics,	  wool,	  man-­‐made	  fiber,	  synthetic	  materials	  and	  of	  silk	  blends	  or	  non-­‐cotton	  
vegetable	  fibers.	  
• Under	  these	  five	  categories	  were	  149	  categories	  reported	  at	  the	  three	  digit	  level.	  
Each	  five	  digit	  category	  consists	  of	  varying	  amounts	  of	  the	  149	  three	  digit	  categories.	  
• Within	  each	  three	  digit	  category	  there	  are	  an	  average	  of	  seventeen	  products	  
reported	  at	  the	  HS	  10	  digit	  level	  	  
	  
India	  was	  governed	  by	  specific	  quotas	  under	  the	  MFA.	  Specific	  quotas	  were	  reported	  by	  
OTEXA	  as	  being	  the	  most	  restrictive	  and	  were	  standardized	  across	  units	  of	  measurement	  and	  were	  
all	  represented	  in	  square	  meter	  equivalents	  (SME’s).	  By	  standardizing	  the	  units	  of	  measurement	  
authorities	  essentially	  standardized	  the	  quota	  restrictions	  across	  categories.	  The	  restrictions	  were	  of	  
a	  weighted	  nature	  and	  therefore	  India’s’	  most	  common	  exports	  faced	  relatively	  heavier	  restrictions.	  
I	  	  
	  
The	  OTEXA	  quota	  classifications	  were	  coupled	  with	  U.S	  Customs	  and	  Border	  Protection	  
reporting’s	  that	  provided	  information	  on	  the	  quota	  fill	  rate	  for	  each	  three	  digit	  classification	  for	  
2004.	  Although	  OTEXA	  standardized	  all	  units	  to	  SME’s,	  The	  U.S.	  Customs	  and	  Border	  Protection	  
maintained	  original	  unit	  listings,	  they	  also	  provided	  the	  percentage	  fill	  rate	  for	  particular	  OTEXA	  
three	  digit	  listings,	  or	  groupings	  of	  the	  three	  digit	  listings.	  	  
Therefore	  the	  mapping	  of	  quota	  fill	  rates	  to	  products	  was	  done	  only	  at	  one	  point	  in	  time	  -­‐	  2004.	  And	  
therefore	  did	  not	  take	  into	  account	  the	  ‘phasing	  out’	  of	  the	  MFA,	  although	  quotas	  had	  been	  relaxed	  
on	  various	  Indian	  exports,	  across	  all	  major	  categories	  prior	  to	  2004,	  quotas	  on	  the	  categories	  that	  
contained	  the	  highest	  concentration	  of	  Indian	  trade	  volumes	  were	  intact	  at	  the	  end	  of	  2004.	  ,	  and	  
thus	  made	  it	  possible	  to	  analyze	  the	  sales	  and	  price	  decisions	  made	  by	  firms	  of	  originally	  bound	  and	  















2.2 Brief	  Literature	  Review	  and	  Lessons	  from	  China:	  
	  
This	  brief	  literature	  review	  aims	  to	  provide	  insight	  into	  passed	  research,	  conducted	  primarily	  
at	  the	  industry	  level,	  in	  the	  East	  Asian	  textile	  and	  clothing	  economy	  as	  well	  as	  taking	  a	  closer	  look	  at	  
research	  having	  used	  similar	  data	  sets	  and	  specifications	  to	  that	  of	  this	  study.	  It	  presents	  key	  findings	  
from	  four	  studies	  conducted	  using	  MFA	  and	  quota	  testing	  specifications,	  analysis	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  
the	  MFA	  removal	  on	  China	  as	  well	  as	  studies	  using	  CMIE	  data	  and	  multi-­‐product	  firms.	  	  
	  
Substantial	  research	  has	  been	  carried	  out	  to	  test	  several	  hypotheses	  primarily	  looking	  at	  the	  
effect	  of	  the	  MFA	  phase	  out,	  whether	  it	  is	  at	  the	  industry	  level	  or	  global.	  Background	  research	  into	  
the	  Indian	  textile	  industry	  shows	  that	  textiles	  contribute	  significantly	  to	  India’s	  export	  earnings,	  15%	  
of	  total	  exports	  are	  attributed	  to	  the	  textile	  and	  clothing	  sector.	  The	  U.S	  and	  E.U	  account	  for	  roughly	  
two	  thirds	  of	  India’s	  textile	  exports.	  With	  further	  liberalization	  the	  growth	  in	  the	  Indian	  textile	  and	  
clothing	  industry	  can	  only	  be	  expected	  to	  increase.	  According	  to	  (Chaudhary,	  2005)	  in	  the	  post-­‐quota	  
period,	  India	  has	  become	  increasingly	  popular	  as	  a	  sourcing	  agent	  for	  buyers.	  Chaudhary	  emphasizes	  
that	  Indian	  manufacturers	  are	  also	  working	  toward	  enhancing	  their	  capacities	  to	  fulfill	  this	  increased	  
demand.	  “India’s	  textiles	  and	  clothing	  export	  registered	  robust	  growth	  of	  25%	  in	  2005-­‐06,	  recording	  
a	  growth	  of	  US$3.5	  billion	  in	  value	  terms,	  thereby	  reaching	  a	  level	  of	  US$17.52	  billion.	  The	  growth	  
continued	  in	  2006-­‐07	  as	  textile	  and	  clothing	  exports	  were	  US$19.15	  billion,	  recording	  an	  increase	  of	  
9.28%	  over	  previous	  the	  year.”	  (Chaudhary,	  2011).	  
	  
Further	  literature	  provided	  by	  (Tewari,	  2005)	  provides	  insight	  into	  how	  Indian	  firms	  
restructured	  their	  competitive	  and	  comparative	  advantages	  and	  integrated	  themselves	  into	  the	  
global	  market	  structure.	  The	  main	  findings	  from	  (Tewari,	  2005)	  show	  how	  India’s’	  path	  to	  global	  
integration	  in	  textiles	  and	  apparel	  differs	  from	  the	  path	  of	  its	  proximate	  competitors,	  which	  has	  
occurred	  without	  significant	  FDI,	  or	  entry	  into	  regional	  Free	  Trade	  Agreements	  (such	  as	  NAFTA)	  or	  
deep	  insertion	  into	  dominant	  global	  supply	  chains.	  (Tewari,	  2005)	  emphasizes	  that	  India’s’	  growth	  is	  
attributed	  to	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  tier	  of	  highly	  competitive	  domestic	  firms	  that	  were	  able	  to	  
restructure	  themselves	  during	  the	  deregulation	  of	  the	  textiles	  in	  the	  mid	  1980’s.	  (Tewani,	  2005).	  	  
	  
In	  light	  of	  the	  positive	  growth	  and	  competition	  dynamics	  of	  Indian	  firms,	  empirical	  work	  
providing	  evidence	  on	  the	  characteristics	  of	  such	  restructuring,	  and	  the	  within	  firm	  dynamics	  of	  
multi-­‐product	  	  firms	  is	  minimal.	  Firm	  level	  studies	  have	  mainly	  been	  undertaken	  in	  the	  U.S	  and	  
review	  the	  substantial	  gains	  in	  aggregate	  output	  that	  arise	  when	  trade	  liberalization	  takes	  place,	  
however	  many	  of	  these	  studies	  treat	  firms	  as	  single	  product	  producers	  as	  well	  as	  abstracting	  away	  
from	  the	  within	  firm	  dynamics,	  and	  product	  mix	  decisions.	  (Goldberg	  et	  al	  2008).	  
	  
The	  MFA	  removal	  has	  created	  expectations	  of	  increased	  growth	  for	  large	  developing	  
countries	  such	  as	  India,	  with	  predictions	  of	  surges	  in	  manufacturing	  growth,	  export	  growth	  and	  
various	  productivity	  improvements,	  as	  well	  as	  market	  restructuring	  favoring	  more	  productive	  firms.	  
However	  the	  most	  relevant	  and	  most	  concise	  studies	  have	  been	  conducted	  by	  a	  select	  group	  of	  
researchers.	  The	  empirical	  approach	  and	  results	  of	  such	  studies	  have	  provided	  the	  basic	  framework	  













(Brambilla,	  Khandelwal	  and	  Schott	  2007)	  analyze	  China’s	  experience	  under	  the	  MFA	  and	  ATC	  
restrictions	  and	  provide	  projections	  of	  export	  growth	  and	  market	  restructuring	  when	  compared	  to	  
other	  major	  U.S	  textile	  and	  clothing	  trade	  partners.	  The	  authors	  firstly	  emphasize	  that	  Chinese	  
textile	  and	  clothing	  exports	  were	  more	  quota	  restrained	  than	  their	  other	  trading	  counterparts,	  thus	  
resulting	  in	  an	  export	  surge	  (post	  quota	  removal)	  that	  was	  unmatched	  by	  any	  of	  the	  U.S’s	  other	  
textile	  and	  clothing	  trade	  partners.	  Chinese	  exports	  increased	  39%	  year	  on	  year	  in	  2005,	  of	  which	  the	  
sales	  of	  products	  originally	  quota	  bound	  increased	  270%.	  This	  provides	  some	  insight	  into	  the	  
potential	  gains	  that	  Indian	  firms	  can	  experience	  in	  export	  growth	  post	  2005.	  
(Brambilla	  et	  al	  2007)	  emphasize	  Chinese	  exports	  being	  additionally	  constrained	  across	  three	  
dimensions,	  relative	  to	  other	  textile	  and	  clothing	  exporters	  under	  the	  MFA.	  And	  these	  may	  be	  
significant	  contributing	  factors	  to	  the	  unrivaled	  growth	  in	  sales	  post	  quota	  removal.	  	  	  
i. Chinese	  quotas	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  binding	  than	  those	  quotas	  experienced	  by	  other	  
countries.	  
ii. China’s	  quotas	  grew	  at	  a	  slower	  rate	  than	  those	  of	  other	  countries.	  
iii. The	  US	  had	  placed	  greater	  restrictions	  on	  china.	  	  
	  
The	  authors	  illustrate	  that	  the	  surge	  in	  Chinese	  exports	  came	  at	  the	  expense	  U.S	  domestic	  
production	  and	  at	  that	  of	  other	  U.S	  trading	  partners.	  	  The	  authors	  show	  that	  virtually	  all	  other	  
trading	  partners	  experienced	  export	  decline	  in	  2005	  and	  in	  extreme	  cases,	  such	  as	  Southern-­‐Africa	  
experiencing	  complete	  reversals	  in	  textile	  and	  clothing	  export	  growth,	  post	  2005.	  Therefore	  it	  is	  
plausible	  that	  the	  MFA	  and	  ATC	  had	  evolved	  from	  a	  policy	  intended	  to	  protect	  the	  domestic	  U.S	  
textile	  manufacturing	  sector,	  into	  one	  that	  provided	  shelter	  for	  smaller	  textile	  and	  clothing	  
producers,	  from	  the	  global	  competition	  of	  large	  developing	  economies	  such	  as	  China	  and	  India.	  
(Brambilla	  et	  al	  2007).	  	  
	  
In	  addition	  to	  additional	  Chinese	  restrictions,	  results	  also	  show	  that	  India	  has	  relatively	  
higher	  bound	  products	  when	  compared	  to	  other	  global	  textile	  and	  clothing	  exporters.	  Taking	  specific	  
quotas	  into	  account,	  India	  has	  an	  average	  fill	  rate	  of	  70%	  -­‐	  for	  the	  products	  reported	  to	  be	  quota	  
restricted.	  Bangladesh,	  India	  and	  China	  exhibit	  the	  largest	  share	  of	  quota	  fill	  rates	  over	  the	  period	  
from	  1990	  to	  2004,	  in	  each	  case	  quota	  fill	  rates	  exceed	  60%.	  Secondly	  for	  the	  period	  1990-­‐2004	  
China	  experienced	  61%	  of	  its	  exports	  constrained	  by	  a	  specific	  quota	  –	  governing	  the	  exact	  
quantities	  available	  for	  export.	  This	  is	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  Indian	  case,	  where	  by	  specific	  quota’s	  only	  
governed	  20%	  of	  Indian	  exports.	  (Brambilla	  et	  al	  2007).	  	  
	  
(Brambilla	  et	  al	  2007)	  estimate	  the	  differential	  growth	  associated	  with	  the	  relaxation	  of	  
quotas	  on	  bound	  and	  unbound	  products.	  They	  regress	  the	  change	  in	  countries	  export	  quantities	  on	  
region-­‐year	  dummies,	  interacted	  with	  a	  dummy	  variable	  indicating	  whether	  Chinese	  quotas	  were	  
previously	  binding.	  This	  difference-­‐in-­‐difference	  method	  proved	  valuable	  for	  the	  estimation	  methods	  
used	  for	  this	  particular	  study.	  	  They	  use	  a	  similar	  method	  to	  estimate	  changes	  within	  countries	  
products,	  by	  changing	  the	  dependent	  variable	  from	  changes	  in	  export	  quantities	  to	  changes	  in	  
estimated	  quality	  of	  a	  product.	  Results	  show	  that	  Indian,	  Bangladesh	  and	  Pakistan	  export	  surges	  
were	  positive	  and	  consistent	  with	  expectations.	  However	  findings	  were	  not	  statistically	  significant	  
and	  therefore	  further	  analysis	  incorporating	  Chinese	  data	  was	  needed	  for	  significant	  results.	  












	  However	  findings	  from	  (Brambilla	  et	  al	  2007)	  abstract	  away	  from	  addressing	  firm	  level	  
dynamics	  and	  do	  not	  address	  the	  source	  of	  export	  growth	  as	  coming	  from	  extensive	  or	  intensive	  
margins.	  Thus	  gives	  an	  opportunity	  look	  at	  firms’	  decisions	  across	  the	  intensive	  margin.	  	  
(Khandelwal,	  Schott	  and	  Wei	  (2011))	  Conduct	  analysis	  on	  Chinas’	  textile	  and	  clothing	  
industry	  before	  and	  after	  January	  2005.	  They	  use	  firm	  level,	  Chinese	  trade	  data	  to	  determine	  how	  
the	  distribution	  of	  textile	  and	  clothing	  exports	  changed	  within	  and	  across	  firms	  as	  quotas	  were	  
removed.	  They	  aimed	  to	  gauge	  whether	  these	  changes	  are	  consistent	  with	  an	  allocation	  of	  quotas	  to	  
the	  most	  productive	  firms	  prior	  to	  their	  removal.	  	  They	  assess	  efficiency	  using	  a	  model	  of	  “efficient	  
allocation”.	  Although	  the	  specific	  empirics	  are	  not	  aligned	  to	  this	  study,	  there	  is	  still	  valuable	  insight	  
gained	  into	  the	  use	  of	  firm	  level	  data	  and	  the	  within	  firm	  dynamics	  experienced	  by	  firms	  at	  the	  end	  
of	  the	  MFA.	  	  
The	  results	  show	  surges	  in	  export	  growth	  across	  Chinese	  firms	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  quota	  
removal.	  Exports	  grew	  and	  sales	  quantities	  surged,	  while	  export	  product	  prices	  declined.	  They	  show	  
that	  these	  responses	  are	  primarily	  due	  to	  the	  extensive	  margin:	  emphasizing	  those	  new	  firms	  
entering	  the	  textile	  and	  clothing	  market	  gained	  market	  share	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  existing,	  state-­‐owned	  
firms,	  due	  to	  being	  able	  to	  enter	  at	  relatively	  low	  prices.	  (Khandelwal	  et	  al	  2011).	  These	  reactions	  are	  
inconsistent	  with	  an	  ex	  ante	  assignment	  of	  quotas	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  firm	  productivity.”	  They	  elaborate	  
on	  the	  significant	  effect	  a	  quota	  licensing	  institution	  has	  on	  a	  firm	  productivity	  gain	  following	  the	  
removal	  of	  a	  quota	  system.	  They	  also	  report	  that	  total	  factor	  productivity	  among	  textile	  and	  clothing	  
firms	  rose	  10.3%	  because	  of	  the	  removal	  of	  the	  quota.	  
The	  firm	  level	  diagnostics	  report	  that	  “following	  liberalization,	  we	  observe	  substantial	  
reallocation	  away	  from	  inefficient	  incumbent	  firms,	  toward	  efficient	  entrants,	  which	  implies	  large	  
productivity	  gains	  among	  these	  textile	  exporters.”	  (Khandelwal	  et	  al	  2011).	  Although,	  reaffirming	  the	  
productivity	  gains	  and	  increases	  in	  exports	  and	  sales.	  This	  is	  consistent	  with	  findings	  from	  (Tewari	  
2005),	  emphasizing	  that	  the	  Indian	  textile	  and	  clothing	  sector	  has	  a	  tier	  of	  highly	  productive	  and	  
efficient	  firms	  that	  contribute	  significantly	  to	  overall	  Indian	  exports.	  	  
	   (Goldberg,	  Khandelwal,	  Pavcnik	  and	  Topalova	  (2008))	  conduct	  research	  into	  multi-­‐product	  
producing	  firms	  in	  India	  (assuming	  the	  most	  productive	  tier	  of	  firms	  are	  mulit-­‐product	  producers).	  
The	  main	  relevance	  of	  their	  study	  was	  the	  data	  analysis	  carried	  out	  using	  the	  CMIE	  data.	  It	  aims	  to	  
investigate	  the	  margin	  of	  adjustment	  to	  trade	  reforms,	  and	  the	  reallocation	  of	  output	  within	  firms	  
through	  changes	  in	  their	  product	  mix.	  The	  study	  is	  conducted	  over	  the	  entire	  manufacturing	  sector	  
and	  therefore	  does	  not	  provide	  specific	  insight	  into	  textile	  manufacturers,	  however	  the	  study	  is	  
conducted	  during	  the	  MFA	  and	  ATC	  restrictions	  (1989-­‐2003),	  and	  they	  find	  that	  changes	  in	  the	  
product	  mix	  had	  an	  insignificant	  effect	  on	  growth	  across	  all	  manufacturing	  firms.	  	  The	  authors	  do	  not	  
find	  evidence	  of	  product	  dropping	  in	  raw	  data,	  and	  therefore	  are	  unable	  to	  connect	  the	  changes	  in	  
firms’	  product	  mix	  through	  product	  additions	  to	  changes	  in	  trade	  policy.	  (Goldberg	  et	  al	  2008).	  
However	  their	  study	  provided	  a	  valuable	  understanding	  of	  the	  CMIE	  database	  and	  structure	  of	  the	  
Indian	  manufacturing	  sector.	  	  	  	  
	   This	  provided	  an	  opening	  to	  investigate	  how	  changes	  in	  trade	  reform	  affect	  multi-­‐firm	  
product	  decisions.	  Specifically	  the	  differential	  changes	  in	  sales	  and	  prices	  of	  products	  originally	  












3. Quota	  Theory:	  
This	  section	  aims	  to	  outline	  basic	  trade	  theory4	  that	  provides	  a	  frame	  work	  for	  our	  empirical	  
estimation.	  As	  well	  as	  providing	  clear	  and	  testable	  hypotheses.	  	  
	  
The	  first	  area	  this	  study	  aims	  to	  address	  in	  the	  impact	  that	  quotas	  have	  on	  trade	  volumes,	  
secondly	  the	  impact	  an	  import	  quota	  has	  on	  unit	  value’s	  –	  or	  price	  –	  and	  thus	  the	  impact	  a	  quota	  
places	  on	  the	  quality	  of	  goods	  imported.	  In	  order	  to	  present	  the	  theoretical	  effects	  that	  a	  binding	  
quota	  has	  on	  trade	  volumes,	  price,	  quality	  and	  welfare,	  the	  role	  of	  market	  structure	  need	  to	  be	  
addressed.	  
	  
i. Perfect	  Competition:	  
Under	  perfect	  competition	  there	  is	  an	  ‘equivalence	  effect’5	  between	  tariffs	  and	  quotas.	  
Applying	  a	  quota	  that	  limits	  the	  number	  of	  units	  imported	  will	  essentially	  have	  the	  same	  effect	  as	  
applying	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  tariff.	  Under	  perfect	  competition	  if	  government	  of	  the	  importing	  country	  
imposed	  a	  quota,	  this	  quota	  will	  limit	  the	  quantity	  of	  the	  specific	  product	  being	  imported,	  essentially	  
creating	  a	  vertical	  export	  supply	  curve.	  This	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  figure	  (b)	  in	  the	  theory	  appendix,	  
whereby	  there	  is	  an	  imperfectly	  inelastic	  supply	  curve	  denoted	  by	  X*.	  	  The	  imposed	  quota	  increases	  
prices	  and	  leads	  to	  an	  increased	  supply	  in	  the	  domestic	  market	  and	  a	  reduced	  demand,	  this	  is	  shown	  
in	  figure	  (a)	  in	  the	  theory	  appendix	  (the	  domestic	  market).	  This	  restriction	  in	  the	  quantity	  of	  goods	  
being	  imported	  by	  the	  domestic	  agent	  will	  result	  in	  price	  increases	  in	  the	  domestic	  market	  due	  to	  
supply	  constraints.6	  
The	  equivalence	  effect	  can	  be	  seen	  by	  there	  being	  an	  equivalent	  effect	  on	  price,	  
consumption	  and	  production	  if	  government	  of	  the	  domestic	  country	  had	  initially	  imposed	  a	  tariff	  
equal	  to	  the	  change	  in	  price	  the	  quota	  causes.	  The	  resulting	  welfare	  effect	  in	  such	  a	  case	  would	  be	  
the	  net	  effect	  of	  consumer	  surplus	  loss,	  plus	  producer	  surplus	  gain.	  This	  is	  an	  advantage	  for	  the	  
domestic	  country	  importing	  the	  goods,	  as	  it	  stands	  to	  collect	  the	  quota	  rents.	  Rents	  are	  equal	  to	  the	  
price	  difference	  between	  domestic	  (higher)	  prices	  and	  the	  world	  price,	  multiplied	  by	  the	  amount	  of	  
goods	  imported.	  In	  summary,	  when	  a	  trade	  policy	  instrument	  causes	  a	  fixed	  import	  level	  in	  perfect	  
competition,	  then	  there	  is	  an	  equivalence	  effect	  on	  prices	  and	  quantity.	  
	  
ii. Imperfect	  Competition:	  
The	  equivalence	  result	  does	  not	  hold	  for	  imperfect	  competition.	  By	  analyzing	  a	  monopolistic	  
and	  a	  duopolistic	  market	  structure,	  a	  quota	  and	  tariff	  that	  have	  comparable	  effects	  on	  the	  level	  of	  
imports	  will	  have	  differing	  effects	  on	  the	  import	  price,	  quality	  and	  therefore	  the	  welfare	  of	  the	  home	  
country.	  	  
In	  imperfect	  competition	  a	  quota	  causes	  a	  sheltered	  market	  within	  the	  domestic	  market	  and	  
the	  equivalence	  effect	  is	  broken	  down.	  The	  quota	  shelters	  domestic	  firms	  from	  outside	  competition	  
and	  thus	  leads	  to	  higher	  prices	  and	  lower	  sales	  than	  what	  it	  would	  be	  under	  a	  tariff	  with	  the	  same	  
level	  of	  imports.	  (Feenstra	  2004:	  8-­‐9).	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  All	  theory	  is	  cited	  from	  Feenstra	  	  :	  Advanced	  International	  Trade	  (2002).	  	  
5	  Result	  from	  Bhadwati	  (1965)	  cited	  in	  Feenstra	  Advanced	  International	  Trade	  (2002)	  Chapter	  8	  :	  1.	  












Under	  imperfect	  competition	  when	  a	  tariff	  is	  applied	  to	  a	  domestic	  monopoly,	  the	  monopoly	  
is	  able	  to	  charge	  as	  much	  as	  the	  world	  price	  plus	  the	  tariff	  amount	  (P*	  +	  t),	  but	  no	  more.	  This	  is	  
illustrated	  in	  figure	  (c)	  in	  the	  theory	  appendix.	  At	  this	  point	  its	  marginal	  revenue	  curve	  is	  horizontal	  
at	  the	  price	  of	  (P*	  +	  t),	  and	  thus	  the	  profit	  maximizing	  quantity	  is	  where	  price	  equals	  marginal	  cost.	  
Therefore	  imports	  result	  in	  the	  difference	  between	  consumption	  and	  production,	  at	  the	  profit	  
maximizing	  price.	  However	  when	  a	  quota	  is	  imposed,	  any	  price	  above	  the	  world	  price	  plus	  the	  tariff	  
amount	  (p*+	  t)	  will	  result	  in	  the	  same	  quantity	  being	  imported.	  Thus	  the	  monopolist	  has	  the	  ability	  
to	  influence	  the	  domestic	  price	  through	  the	  changes	  is	  demand.	  The	  quota	  enables	  the	  monopolist	  
to	  exercise	  market	  power	  and	  thus	  there	  is	  a	  higher	  welfare	  cost,	  and	  the	  equivalence	  effect	  no	  
longer	  holds.	  7	  
	  
Although	  the	  monopoly	  case	  provides	  insight	  into	  the	  imperfect	  competition	  case,	  there	  are	  
more	  applicable	  results	  when	  analyzing	  a	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  firm	  engaged	  in	  Cournot	  or	  Bertrand	  
competition.	  Under	  Cournot	  –Nash	  equilibrium,	  restricting	  the	  foreign	  firm	  to	  sell	  less	  than	  the	  free	  
trade	  equivalent	  will	  shift	  sales	  toward	  the	  domestic	  firm.	  The	  Bertrand	  competition	  case	  is	  the	  most	  
applicable	  to	  this	  study	  as	  it	  takes	  into	  account	  pricing	  and	  quantity	  decisions	  that	  competitive	  firms	  
are	  faced	  with	  when	  under	  competition.	  Under	  Bertrand	  competition	  the	  foreign	  firm	  (exporter)	  is	  
limited	  to	  selling	  less	  than	  or	  equal	  to	  the	  quota	  quantity,	  and	  therefore	  it	  is	  unreasonable	  to	  
suppose	  firms	  engage	  in	  competition	  regarding	  the	  prices	  of	  the	  other	  firm	  as	  fixed.	  	  The	  domestic	  
firm	  has	  the	  opportunity	  to	  increase	  prices	  and	  shift	  sales	  toward	  the	  exporter	  firm;	  however	  the	  
export	  firm	  is	  unable	  to	  exceed	  the	  quota	  amount	  and	  thus	  has	  to	  also	  increase	  its	  prices.	  In	  such	  
cases	  this	  is	  also	  proxied	  as	  quality	  increases	  as	  restricted	  exporting	  firms	  increase	  the	  quality	  of	  
goods	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  boost	  revenue.	  Thus	  under	  Bertrand	  competition,	  the	  domestic	  firm	  is	  able	  
to	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  quota	  constraint,	  increase	  prices	  and	  know	  that	  the	  foreign	  firm	  will	  have	  
to	  do	  the	  same.	  Thus,	  essentially	  resulting	  in	  a	  ‘first	  mover	  advantage’	  for	  the	  domestic	  firm.	  
(Feenstra	  2004:	  8	  –	  12).	  	  
	  
Therefore	  trade	  theory	  suggests	  	  the	  optimal	  action	  of	  the	  domestic	  firm	  would	  be	  to	  increase	  prices	  
in	  an	  attempt	  to	  boost	  revenue	  that	  is	  constrained	  by	  the	  quota	  restricting	  the	  quantity	  of	  goods	  
being	  exported.	  Thus	  when	  the	  Indian	  textile	  and	  clothing	  industry	  is	  faced	  with	  quota	  restrictions	  
one	  firstly	  see’s	  the	  quantity	  of	  sales	  (exported)	  decreasing,	  along	  with	  the	  increase	  in	  prices	  of	  
goods	  (unit	  values).	  In	  such	  cases	  this	  can	  be	  proxied	  as	  a	  quality	  upgrading.	  Therefore	  at	  the	  most	  
basic	  level,	  we	  expect	  a	  surge	  in	  the	  quantity	  of	  sales	  leaving	  Indian	  shores	  to	  increase	  post	  MFA	  
removal.	  And	  we	  expect	  there	  to	  be	  a	  decrease	  in	  the	  prices	  of	  goods	  sold,	  and	  therefore	  possibly	  
cheaper	  quality	  goods	  sold.	  	  	  
	  
In	  this	  study,	  the	  focus	  will	  be	  on	  firm’s	  quantity	  and	  price	  decisions	  that	  result	  from	  quota	  removal	  
and	  the	  following	  main	  hypotheses	  will	  be	  tested.	  
i. The	  removal	  of	  the	  MFA	  should	  increase	  the	  quantity	  of	  exports	  of	  previously	  quota	  
restricted	  products	  relative	  to	  unbound	  products.	  
ii. The	  removal	  of	  the	  MFA	  should	  reduce	  price	  of	  previously	  quota	  restricted	  products	  
relative	  to	  unbound	  products.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  












The	  compilation	  of	  a	  product	  by	  firm	  dataset,	  with	  a	  mapping	  to	  quota	  fill	  rates	  is	  key	  to	  analyzing	  
the	  firm	  product	  decisions	  across	  prices	  and	  sales.	  Quantity	  responses	  to	  the	  removal	  of	  the	  quota	  
are	  fairly	  simple	  and	  intuitive	  and	  the	  surges	  in	  quantity	  of	  sales,	  or	  exports	  have	  two	  possible	  
sources.	  The	  first	  being	  a	  net	  growth	  in	  the	  sales	  of	  firms	  existing	  products	  (across	  their	  intensive	  
margin)	  and	  secondly	  net	  growth	  in	  sales	  due	  to	  adding	  additional	  products	  to	  their	  product	  mix	  that	  
were	  not	  previously	  produced	  –	  (across	  their	  extensive	  margin).	  	  
	  
This	  study	  aims	  to	  specifically	  look	  at	  the	  intensive	  margin	  and	  analyze	  the	  effect	  on	  sales	  of	  
previously	  bound	  products	  compared	  to	  unbound	  products	  after	  the	  MFA	  removal,	  as	  well	  as	  looking	  
at	  the	  price	  effects	  under	  the	  same	  specifications.	  The	  empirical	  specifications	  of	  such	  tests	  will	  be	  
discussed	  below.	  	  	  
	  
4.1 Empirical	  Specification:	  
	  
A	  difference-­‐	  in-­‐difference	  strategy	  is	  employed	  to	  examine	  the	  impact	  that	  the	  quota	  removal	  has	  
on	  firm	  decisions	  in	  2005.	  The	  focus	  is	  on	  the	  effects	  on	  firm	  sales	  and	  prices	  of	  products	  being	  
produced	  by	  Indian	  textile	  and	  clothing	  firms.	  The	  difference	  –in	  –	  difference	  specification	  looks	  at	  
the	  differential	  effects	  in	  sales	  and	  prices	  of	  quota	  restricted	  products,	  compared	  to	  unrestricted	  
products	  before	  and	  after	  the	  quota	  was	  lifted	  in	  2005.	  
	  
	  The	  basic	  models	  make	  use	  of	  a	  log-­‐level	  functional	  form,	  where	  by:	  	  	  
o i	  =	  product,	  j=	  firm	  t	  =	  time	  
o Boundi	  =	  dummy	  that	  equals	  1	  if	  the	  quota	  fill	  rate	  for	  product	  i	  is	  greater	  than	  90%,	  zero	  
otherwise.	  
	  
There	  is	  an	  additional	  bound	  dummy	  variable	  that	  accounts	  for	  garments	  and	  cotton	  fabrics	  whereby	  
if	  these	  product	  categories	  are	  =	  1	  it	  shows	  the	  product	  is	  quota	  bound	  and	  all	  other	  categories	  =	  0	  
showing	  those	  product	  listings	  are	  unbound.	  The	  overall	  specifications	  are	  the	  same	  despite	  the	  
different	  dummy	  variable	  specifications.	  
	  
o Post	  t	  =	  dummy	  that	  =	  1	  if	  year	  is	  2005	  or	  later,	  zero	  otherwise.	  The	  use	  of	  time	  dummy	  
variables	  enables	  us	  to	  abstract	  away	  from	  deflation	  of	  firm	  factor	  of	  production	  input	  prices	  
over	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  study.	  	  
o Exporter	  =	  1	  if	  firm	  had	  recorded	  exports	  for	  a	  minimum	  period	  of	  2004-­‐2006,	  otherwise	  =	  0.	  
This	  ensures	  that	  export	  data	  is	  reliable	  and	  avoids	  analyzing	  firms	  that	  don’t	  have	  
consistent	  export	  figures	  relevant	  to	  the	  time	  of	  this	  study.	  	  
	  
Firstly,	  the	  basic	  difference-­‐	  in-­‐difference	  specification:	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   (1)8	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  












Where  𝜆! 	  and	  𝜆!  are	  product	  and	  year	  fixed	  effects.	  Fixed	  effects	  estimators	  capture	  time	  -­‐	  invariant	  
product	  -­‐	  specific	  and	  year	  -­‐	  	  specific	  shocks	  in	  firm	  sales	  that	  may	  be	  correlated	  with	  the	  removal	  of	  
the	  quota.	  This	  is	  the	  baseline	  model	  to	  analyze	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  quota	  removal.	  The	  coefficient	  β3	  
captures	  the	  differential	  sales	  in	  quota	  restricted	  products	  after	  the	  quota	  was	  removed	  i.e.:	  it	  is	  the	  
difference-­‐in-­‐difference	  estimate	  of	  the	  effect	  on	  the	  quota	  sales.	  	  
Next,	  we	  refine	  our	  specification	  by	  controlling	  for	  unobserved	  firm	  specific	  shocks	  in	  sales.	  For	  
instance,	  one	  concern	  is	  that	  particular	  firm	  types	  select	  into	  production	  of	  quota	  restricted	  products	  
and	  that	  these	  factors	  determining	  such	  selection	  are	  unobserved.	  This	  would	  then	  lead	  to	  
inconsistent	  estimates	  of	  the	  effect	  of	  trade	  liberalization	  on	  sales	  figures.	  Since	  we	  have	  firm	  level	  
data,	  we	  can	  control	  for	  such	  factors	  as	  long	  as	  they	  are	  time-­‐invariant,	  and	  we	  can	  do	  this	  by	  using	  
firm	  fixed	  effects.	  We	  hence	  estimate:	  	  
	  
	  	   𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠!"# =   𝛼! +   𝛿!𝑖𝑗 +   𝛿!𝑗𝑡 + 𝛿!𝐵𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖 ∗   𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡! +   𝑢!,!"#	   (2)	  
	  
The	  difference-­‐indifference	  coefficient	  𝛿!	  once	  again	  captures	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  quota	  
removal.	  This	  specification	  now	  includes	  a	  firm	  by	  product	  fixed	  effect.	  This	  includes	  a	  firm	  specific	  
effect	  and	  product	  fixed	  effect.	  Thus,	  we	  use	  the	  variation	  within	  each	  firm	  over	  time	  and	  contrast	  
firms	  producing	  bound	  products	  with	  firms	  producing	  unbound	  products.	  
This	  specification	  has	  firm	  by	  time	  fixed	  effects.	  This	  is	  our	  most	  unrestricted	  specification,	  where	  we	  
only	  exploit	  within-­‐firm,	  cross	  product	  variation	  between	  products	  that	  are	  quota	  bound	  and	  
unbound,	  with	  the	  aim	  to	  identify	  the	  effect	  the	  MFA	  removal	  has	  on	  such	  variables.	  	  	  
	  
The	  specification	  once	  again	  makes	  use	  of	  a	  difference-­‐in-­‐difference	  coefficient,	  that	  now	  
incorporates	  a	  variable	  indicating	  whether	  a	  firm	  is	  an	  exporter	  or	  not.	  This	  exporter	  dummy	  is	  
constructed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  whether	  a	  firm	  has	  export	  figures	  before	  and	  after	  the	  quota	  removal	  in	  
2005.	  And	  thus	  hopes	  to	  capture	  the	  effect	  on	  sales	  including	  whether	  a	  firm	  is	  an	  exporter	  or	  not.	  
The	  MFA	  effected	  exports	  and	  thus	  a	  differential	  effect	  between	  exporters	  and	  non-­‐exporters	  is	  
expected,	  however	  there	  are	  limitations	  to	  this	  specification.	  Quantity	  of	  exported	  sales	  or	  value	  of	  
exports	  cannot	  be	  analyzed	  due	  to	  CMIE	  only	  providing	  export	  data	  at	  firm	  level	  and	  not	  at	  product	  
level,	  thus	  the	  data	  is	  only	  useful	  at	  distinguishing	  exporting	  firms	  from	  non-­‐exporting	  firms.	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  (3)	  
	  
In	  this	  model	  there	  is	  an	  additional	  ‘product-­‐by-­‐year’	  fixed	  effect	  since	  we	  are	  interested	  in	  the	  
differential	  effects	  on	  product	  level	  sales	  after	  quota	  removal	  on	  exporting	  and	  non-­‐exporting	  firms.	  
Thus	  the	  main	  coefficient	  of	  interest	  is	  𝛾!	  capturing	  the	  effect	  between	  exporter	  and	  non-­‐exporter	  
firms.	  
	  
However	  results	  pertaining	  to	  specification	  two	  and	  three	  are	  limited	  due	  to	  available	  computing	  
power	  and	  the	  limit	  of	  this	  study.	  Therefore	  the	  objective	  of	  providing	  the	  specification	  outlines	  is	  to	  
illustrate	  the	  structured	  approach	  carried	  out	  to	  analyzing	  the	  firm	  dynamics	  as	  well	  as	  providing	  
specifications	  that	  were	  thought	  through	  in	  a	  systematic	  manner	  and	  may	  be	  a	  useful	  reference	  for	  














4.2 Data	  Analysis	  and	  Descriptive	  Statistics	  
	  
We	  use	  a	  firm	  level,	  panel	  data	  set	  for	  the	  period	  from	  2002	  –	  2008,	  sourced	  from	  the	  Prowess	  
database	  and	  compiled	  by	  the	  Centre	  for	  Monitoring	  the	  Indian	  Economy	  (CMIE).	  What	  is	  imperative	  
to	  this	  study	  is	  the	  availability	  of	  specific	  firm	  and	  product	  level	  data	  that	  provides	  the	  opportunity	  to	  
explore	  the	  ‘inter’	  and	  ‘intra’	  firm	  dynamics.	  Thus	  a	  primary	  contribution	  of	  this	  study	  is	  the	  
compilation	  of	  such	  detailed	  data	  that	  is	  then	  later	  mapped	  to	  data	  on	  MFA	  quotas	  from	  the	  U.S	  
Customs	  and	  Border	  Protection.	  	  	  
	  
The	  Prowess	  database	  provides	  specific	  firm	  level	  data	  captured	  from	  annual	  income	  statements	  and	  
balance	  sheets	  of	  about	  9500	  publicly	  listed	  companies,	  of	  which	  roughly	  5000	  are	  in	  the	  
manufacturing	  sector.	  The	  companies	  in	  the	  database	  together	  comprise	  60	  to	  70	  percent	  of	  the	  
economic	  activity	  in	  the	  organized	  industrial	  sector,	  and	  account	  for	  75	  percent	  of	  corporate	  taxes	  
and	  95	  percent	  of	  excise	  duty	  collected	  by	  CMIE.	  The	  Prowess	  database	  is	  the	  primary	  Indian	  
database	  that	  allows	  for	  detailed,	  annual	  information	  on	  firms’	  product	  mix	  and	  variables	  such	  as	  
sales,	  production	  and	  capacity.	  Firms	  are	  required	  by	  the	  1956	  companies	  act	  to	  disclose	  such	  
information	  in	  their	  annual	  reports.	  	  For	  each	  product	  manufactured	  by	  a	  firm,	  the	  dataset	  provides	  
the	  values	  of	  sales,	  quantity	  and	  units	  allowing	  for	  a	  time	  series	  construction	  of	  unit	  values	  at	  the	  
firm	  –	  product	  level.	  The	  Prowess	  database	  is	  therefore	  very	  well	  suited	  for	  the	  understanding	  of	  
how	  firms	  adjust	  their	  product	  mix	  over	  time	  in	  response	  to	  policy	  shocks,	  as	  well	  as	  effects	  on	  sales	  
and	  price	  figures	  in	  response	  to	  trade	  liberalization.	  Export	  data	  is	  available	  through	  the	  Prowess	  
database;	  however	  CMIE	  does	  not	  compile	  export	  data	  at	  the	  product	  level,	  and	  thus	  exports	  were	  
only	  reported	  as	  an	  aggregate	  for	  each	  firm	  per	  year.	  
	  
Table	  1:	  Insight	  into	  specific	  CMIE	  dataset	  used	  in	  this	  study	  
	  
Year	  :	  	   2002	   2003	   2004	   2005	   2006	   2007	   2008	   Total	  
Number	  of	  Observations	  :	  	   2559	   2559	   2559	   2559	   2559	   2559	   2559	   17913	  
Number	  of	  Firms	  :	  	   802	   800	   742	   757	   791	   752	   735	   1012	  
Number	  of	  Firms	  Reporting	  Positive	  Sales	  :	  	  	   758	   743	   680	   682	   709	   672	   669	   922	  
Number	  of	  Exporters	  (pre	  &	  post	  2005)	  :	   n/a	   n/a	   163	   165	   166	   162	   164	   2800	  
Number	  of	  Multi	  product	  Producers	  (>3	  products)	  :	  	   281	   272	   243	   274	   256	   223	   260	   856	  
Notes:	  This	  table	  is	  derived	  from	  our	  balanced	  panel,	  firm	  level	  data	  set.	  Compiled	  from	  CMIE	  data	  spanning	  2002	  –	  
2008.	  
	  
The	  objective	  of	  this	  data	  construction	  was	  to	  link	  quota	  fill	  rates	  to	  product	  information.	  
With	  the	  end	  goal	  being	  to	  have	  a	  dataset	  that	  listed	  all	  firms	  in	  the	  Indian	  textile	  and	  clothing	  
sector,	  what	  products	  they	  produced	  and	  what	  the	  quota	  fill	  rate	  was	  on	  each	  specific	  product.	  This	  
is	  what	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  a	  one	  –	  to	  –	  one	  mapping	  between	  firm,	  product	  and	  quota.	  The	  mapping	  
was	  done	  in	  the	  following	  broad	  stages.	  
	  
• The	  first	  step	  was	  to	  clean	  the	  complex	  structure	  of	  the	  CMIE	  product	  classifications	  
and	  to	  gain	  further	  understanding	  into	  the	  structure	  of	  how	  products	  are	  recorded	  
in	  the	  database.	  
• The	  second	  step	  was	  to	  link	  the	  CMIE	  products	  to	  respective	  quota	  categories	  that	  












• The	  final	  part	  for	  data	  construction	  involved	  mapping	  the	  specific	  quota	  fill	  rate9,	  to	  
each	  OTEXA	  quota	  category	  and	  thus	  each	  CMIE	  product	  had	  a	  one	  to	  one	  mapping	  
to	  a	  quota	  fill	  rate.	  	  	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  
Firstly,	  analysis	  of	  the	  CMIE	  product	  classification	  was	  done.	  	  As	  reported	  by	  (Khandelwal	  	  et	  
al	  (2003))	  CMIE	  uses	  an	  internally	  based	  product	  classification	  that	  does	  not	  directly	  link	  to	  the	  
Harmonized	  System	  (HS);	  however	  there	  is	  a	  connection	  made	  to	  the	  National	  Industry	  Code	  
schedules	  (NIC)	  and	  therefore	  the	  ISIC	  3,	  ISIC	  3.1	  and	  ISIC	  4.0	  schedules.	  Various	  inconsistencies	  in	  
product	  names	  and	  product	  coding’s’	  were	  found	  in	  the	  CMIE	  data.	  Inconsistencies	  were	  too	  
extensive	  to	  allow	  dropping	  of	  observations	  and	  thus	  had	  to	  be	  reviewed	  and	  mended	  manually.	  
Example	  of	  such	  problems	  arose	  in	  product	  naming’s’	  such	  as	  “Cotton	  Fabric”	  and	  “Cotton	  Fabrics”	  –	  
obviously	  the	  same	  product,	  however	  reported	  under	  different	  product	  codes.	  	  
	  
	  Table	  2:	  The	  CMIE	  product	  coding	  system:	  
	  
NIC	  :	  	   	  	   	   	   Description	   	  
17	   	   	   	   Manufacture	  of	  Textiles	   	  
17011	   	   Product	  Codes	  (CMIE)	  	   	   Manufacture	  of	  Cotton	  Yarn	  	   	  
	   	   60307000000	   	   Sale	  of	  Fabric	   	  
	   	   60303010000	   	   Cotton	  Yarn	   	  
	   	   60307100100	   	   Cotton	  Fabric	   	  
	   	   60303000000	   	   Yarn	   	  
	   	   60307000000	   	   Cloth	   	  
	   	   60307000000	   	   Cotton	  Handloom	  Cloth	  
	  
	  
Within	  NIC	  17011	  there	  are	  2784	  observations	  (25%)	  and	  62	  unique	  product	  codes/name	  listings	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
18	   	   	   	   Manufacture	  of	  Wearing	  Apparel	   	  
18111	   	   Product	  Codes	  	  (CMIE)	   	   Manufacture	  of	  Apparel	  -­‐	  except	  fur	   	  
	   	   60700000000	   	   Garments	   	  
	   	   60701050000	   	   Cotton	  T-­‐shirts	   	  
	   	   60701150000	   	   Hand	  Gloves	   	  
	   	   60703000000	   	   Jackets	   	  
	   	   60701160000	   	   Cotton	  Socks	  
	  
	  
Within	  NIC	  18111	  there	  are	  298	  observations	  (2.9%)	  and	  20	  unique	  product	  code/name	  listings	   	  
Notes:	  Table	  is	  adapted	  from	  Goldberg,Khandelwal,Pavcnik	  and	  Topalova	  (2008)	  Data	  Appendix	  -­‐	  Table	  A1.	  However	  
this	  is	  specifically	  for	  textile	  firms.	  	  
	  
By	  understanding	  the	  CMIE	  product	  classifications	  and	  the	  complexities	  behind	  it,	  it	  resulted	  
in	  the	  need	  for	  a	  more	  transparent	  and	  consistent	  product	  classification.	  	  The	  primary	  aim	  for	  this	  
study	  was	  to	  attain	  a	  one	  to	  one	  mapping,	  from	  the	  company,	  to	  product,	  to	  quota	  fill	  rate.	  Due	  to	  
data	  complexities	  (mainly	  inconsistencies	  in	  product	  naming’s’	  and	  coding’s’	  from	  different	  reporting	  
parties)	  this	  was	  not	  simple	  and	  thus	  further	  variables	  were	  adjusted	  or	  created	  to	  further	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Reported	  by	  the	  Textiles	  Report,	  compiled	  by	  the	  U.S	  Customs	  and	  Border	  Protection:	  for	  2004.	  Available:	  
http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/trade/trade_programs/textiles_and_quotas/textile_status_report/archi












disaggregate	  product	  specification	  and	  attempt	  to	  form	  a	  one	  –	  to	  -­‐	  one	  mapping.	  The	  one	  -­‐	  to	  –	  one	  
mapping	  was	  only	  achievable	  if	  it	  were	  possible	  to	  link	  the	  CMIE	  product	  listings	  to	  the	  OTEXA	  
product	  listings	  and	  therefore	  have	  the	  quota	  fill	  rate	  for	  the	  specific	  product.	  However	  there	  was	  
differing	  amounts	  of	  disaggregation	  across	  product	  listings,	  between	  the	  CMIE	  product	  listings	  and	  
OTEXA.	  The	  CMIE	  data	  was	  very	  aggregated	  compared	  to	  the	  OTEXA	  product	  data	  and	  therefore	  
made	  it	  impossible	  to	  make	  a	  rational	  link	  by	  only	  looking	  at	  the	  product	  names	  or	  coding’s’.	  In	  
addition	  a	  major	  contributing	  factor	  to	  the	  complexities	  in	  the	  data	  was	  that	  a	  lot	  of	  the	  aggregation	  
across	  the	  CMIE	  data	  was	  within	  product	  categories	  that	  comprised	  of	  significant	  amounts	  of	  Indian	  
exports	  (such	  as	  cotton	  yarn	  and	  garments)	  and	  this	  forced	  the	  need	  to	  create	  some	  kind	  of	  
disaggregation	  on	  the	  CMIE	  data	  and	  this	  was	  done	  through	  creating	  further	  descriptive	  product	  
variables.	  	  
	  
4.3	   Variable	  Construction:	  	  
i. Product	  Codes:	  
	  
From	  the	  original	  CMIE	  data,	  there	  were	  282	  product	  reporting’s’	  for	  the	  panel	  data	  set.	  	  However	  of	  
these	  282	  products,	  CMIE	  had	  significant	  concentrations	  of	  products	  that	  were	  only	  listed	  under	  a	  
two	  digit	  NIC	  code.	  Therefore	  only	  12	  product	  codes	  were	  listed	  by	  CMIE	  under	  these	  NIC’s.	  Most	  of	  
the	  observations	  in	  the	  garments	  category	  fell	  under	  one	  product	  code	  (60700000000)	  which	  is	  the	  
product	  code	  for	  garments.	  	  	  
Therefore	  due	  to	  there	  being	  a	  major	  concentration	  of	  our	  observations	  falling	  into	  categories	  
similar	  to	  that	  of	  garments,	  further	  standardization	  and	  disaggregation	  was	  manually	  done	  to	  split	  
up	  such	  sections,	  providing	  further	  unique	  codes	  to	  the	  relevant	  sub	  sections	  within	  apparel.	  
	  	  
The	  standardization	  of	  products	  and	  the	  revealing	  of	  a	  one-­‐to-­‐one	  mapping	  for	  each	  product-­‐code	  
combination	  were	  done	  by	  uniquely	  coding	  each	  product	  within	  our	  dataset.	  This	  resulted	  in	  splitting	  
up	  the	  concentrated	  groupings	  of	  products	  listed	  under	  the	  CMIE	  data	  scheme,	  and	  thus	  made	  it	  
easier	  to	  map	  our	  products	  to	  a	  quota	  fill	  rate.	  	  	  
	  
Table	  3:	  Encoding	  Process:	  
	  
CMIE	  Product	  Code	   	   CMIE	  Product	  Name	   Encoded	  Variable	   Unique	  Product	  ID	  
60700000000	   	   Readymade	  Garments	   750	   60700000000750	  
60501020201	   	   Polyester	  Processed	  Yarn	   654	   60501020201654	  
60303000000	   	   Yarn	   1012	   603030000001012	  
Note:	  Each	  CMIE	  product	  description	  has	  a	  unique	  product	  ID.	  
	  
	  
Therefore	  by	  assigning	  each	  product	  with	  a	  unique	  identification	  system	  the	  data	  set	  had	  1297	  

















Table	  4:	  Product	  Breakdown:	  
	  
Variable	   2002	   2003	   2004	   2005	   2006	   2007	   2008	   Total	  Number	  in	  Dataset	   	  
Number	  of	  CMIE	  Products	  (11	  digit)	   100	   98	   86	   90	   92	   87	   100	   208	  
Number	  of	  Uniquely	  Coded	  Products	   287	   236	   203	   241	   234	   215	   282	   1297	  
	  
	  
i. Quota	  Fill	  Rates:	  
	  
Quota	  fill	  rates	  were	  accessed	  through	  OTEXA	  and	  manually	  mapped	  to	  each	  282	  unique	  CMIE	  
product	  groupings.	  OTEXA’s	  reporting	  of	  specific	  quota	  fill	  rates,	  for	  textile	  and	  clothing	  imports,	  
show	  149,	  3	  digit	  quota	  categories.	  Within	  each	  3	  digit	  quota	  category,	  there	  are	  products	  listed	  at	  
the	  HS	  10	  digit	  level;	  on	  average	  each	  3	  digit	  category	  has	  17	  HS	  10	  digit	  products,	  resulting	  in	  2533	  
product	  listings	  under	  OTEXA.	  
	  
Specific	  quota	  fill	  rates	  were	  available	  for	  the	  three	  digit	  quota	  categories.	  Although	  there	  was	  
significant	  effort	  made	  to	  address	  the	  differing	  product	  reporting’s	  made	  by	  CMIE	  and	  OTEXA.	  There	  
proved	  to	  be	  significant	  measurement	  error	  when	  allocating	  quota	  fill	  rates	  from	  the	  OTEXA	  
specification	  to	  the	  CMIE	  data	  due	  to	  the	  varying	  degree	  of	  disaggregation	  across	  products.	  As	  seen	  
in	  table	  below,	  OTEXA	  has	  vast	  disaggregation	  and	  a	  concentration	  of	  quota	  fill	  rates	  for	  series	  of	  
cotton	  fabrics	  as	  well	  as	  man-­‐made	  fiber	  and	  apparel.	  These	  two	  categories	  account	  for	  58%	  of	  
OTEXA	  product	  classification.	  However	  the	  same	  level	  of	  disaggregation	  in	  the	  same	  product	  
categories	  cannot	  be	  seen	  on	  the	  CMIE	  data.	  
	  
Quota	  fill	  information	  was	  gathered	  from	  the	  textile	  status	  report	  compiled	  by	  the	  U.S	  Customs	  and	  
Border	  Protection,	  which	  reports	  the	  various	  quota	  fill	  rates	  applying	  to	  each	  OTEXA	  quota	  category	  
for	  2004.	  This	  resulted	  in	  an	  adequate	  mix	  of	  bound	  and	  unbound	  products,	  specifically	  23%	  of	  the	  
products	  were	  bound	  (>90%	  fill)	  where	  as	  25%	  were	  between	  the	  70%	  and	  25%	  fill	  rate	  and	  the	  
remainder	  had	  0	  fill	  rate	  due	  to	  not	  being	  quota	  restrained.	  Starting	  from	  the	  CMIE	  data	  and	  our	  
unique	  product	  listings,	  an	  attempt	  to	  make	  a	  direct	  link	  from	  the	  product	  to	  the	  quota	  category	  was	  
made.	  In	  many	  cases	  this	  was	  successful	  as	  the	  CMIE	  product	  name	  was	  disaggregated	  enough	  to	  
allow	  for	  a	  direct	  comparison	  to	  the	  OTEXA	  classification,	  and	  thus	  the	  quota	  category	  was	  allocated	  
to	  that	  specific	  product	  or	  product	  grouping.	  In	  cases	  where	  there	  were	  numerous	  quota	  categories	  
relevant	  to	  a	  single	  CMIE	  product,	  the	  simple	  average	  (of	  the	  specific	  quota	  fill	  rate)	  across	  those	  


















Table	  5:	  Quota	  fill	  rate	  mapping	  to	  CMIE	  product	  codes:	  
	  




Average	  Quota	  fill	  rate	  across	  Quota	  
Categories	  
Banians	   60701000000	   6.0701E+12	   332	  (Cotton)	   66.70%	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   632	  (Man-­‐Made)	   	  	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   832	  (Silk)	   	  	  
Polyester	  texturized	  
Yarn	  
60501030101	   6.0501E+13	   606	  (Man-­‐Made)	   0.00%	  
	  
Two	  approaches	  were	  followed	  in	  mapping	  quota	  fill	  rates	  to	  products.	  	  
Method	  one	  aimed	  to	  provide	  a	  one-­‐to-­‐one	  mapping	  as	  set	  out	  previously.	  However	  this	  was	  not	  
fully	  successful	  as	  the	  varying	  disaggregation	  reported	  by	  CMIE	  and	  OTEXA	  was	  too	  large	  and	  thus	  
forced	  the	  simple	  average	  quota	  fill	  rate	  to	  be	  taken	  where	  a	  one	  to	  one	  mapping	  was	  not	  
attainable.	  Although	  this	  still	  provided	  absolute	  quota	  fill	  rate	  figures	  and	  data	  it	  was	  not	  entirely	  
accurate	  and	  therefore	  taking	  the	  weighted	  average	  may	  have	  been	  a	  better	  estimation	  of	  quota	  fill	  
rates.	  Specific	  problems	  were	  apparent	  in	  the	  apparel	  section	  where	  products	  reported	  by	  CMIE	  do	  
not	  allow	  for	  distinguishing	  distinct	  product	  classifications	  –	  whether	  through	  naming	  or	  through	  
codes.	  This	  is	  a	  serious	  problem,	  as	  the	  quota	  fill	  rates	  reported	  by	  OTEXA	  have	  a	  mixture	  of	  quota	  
fill	  rates	  of	  100%	  on	  apparel	  products	  and	  0%	  fill	  rates,	  with	  no	  way	  to	  distinguish	  which	  products	  in	  
the	  CMIE	  data	  were	  100%	  or	  0%	  the	  simple	  average	  was	  taken	  over	  the	  whole	  section	  (resulting	  in	  
an	  average	  quota	  fill	  rate	  of	  38%)	  and	  thus	  introduced	  significant	  measurement	  error	  in	  the	  
mapping.	  	  
	  




Notes:	  Histogram	  showing	  the	  frequency	  of	  products	  reported	  by	  CMIE	  to	  have	  the	  same	  name.	  In	  garments	  there	  were	  
14	  products	  reported	  as	  ‘garments’	  and	  in	  one	  case	  73	  observations	  were	  found	  under	  a	  single	  classification.	  In	  the	  
original	  quota	  mapping	  method,	  these	  sections	  would	  have	  all	  been	  identified	  to	  have	  a	  simple	  quota	  average	  fill	  rate	  of	  
37.8%(taken	  across	  the	  entire	  garments	  section)	  due	  to	  there	  being	  no	  way	  to	  further	  identify	  products.	  Hence	  resulting	  
in	  measurement	  error.	  
	  
Secondly	  the	  apparel	  and	  cotton	  fabric	  sectors	  account	  for	  a	  significant	  proportion	  of	  Indian	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Thus,	  due	  to	  most	  of	  Indian	  textile	  and	  clothing	  firms	  being	  found	  to	  produce	  ‘garments’	  ,	  ‘cotton	  
fabric’	  or	  ‘yarn’	  (as	  reported	  by	  CMIE),	  there	  proved	  to	  be	  substantial	  measurement	  error	  in	  how	  
products	  are	  assigned	  quota	  fill	  rates.	  Therefore	  a	  more	  aggregated	  approach	  to	  assigning	  products	  




The	  second	  method	  of	  assigning	  quota	  fill	  rates	  to	  products	  is	  derived	  from	  (Brambilla,	  Khandelwal	  
and	  Schott	  (2007;	  table	  8))	  where	  by	  the	  authors	  identify	  a	  standardized	  quota	  rate	  for	  specific	  
sectors.	  The	  approach	  classifies	  entire	  textile	  categories	  (such	  as	  cotton	  fabrics)	  as	  either	  bound	  or	  
unbound	  and	  thus	  does	  not	  attempt	  to	  assign	  specific	  products	  a	  one	  –	  to	  –	  one	  quota	  fill	  rate	  
mapping.	  The	  Indian	  categories	  that	  are	  listed	  correspond	  to	  cotton	  fabric,	  yarn	  and	  garments	  and	  
show	  fill	  rates	  in	  excess	  of	  90%	  for	  garments	  and	  in	  excess	  of	  70%	  for	  cotton	  fabrics.	  	  
Therefore	  method	  two	  constructs	  a	  dummy	  variable	  that	  identifies	  cotton	  fabrics	  and	  garments	  as	  
bound.	  These	  products	  are	  thus	  classified	  as	  bound	  in	  the	  CMIE	  data	  and	  all	  other	  products	  as	  
unbound.	  This	  resulted	  in	  20%	  of	  the	  observations	  in	  the	  CMIE	  data	  being	  under	  a	  binding	  quota	  
restriction	  in	  2004,	  and	  the	  remaining	  80%	  being	  unrestricted.	  
	  
This	  contrasts	  to	  the	  previous	  method	  whereby	  there	  was	  43%	  of	  our	  observations	  between	  
70%	  and	  25%	  quota	  filled,	  and	  this	  was	  largely	  due	  to	  the	  simple	  average	  being	  taken	  across	  those	  
concentrated	  product	  sections.	  In	  addition	  20%	  was	  below	  25%	  quota	  constrained	  and	  the	  
remaining	  37%	  quota	  bound	  (>70%).	  This	  illustrates	  the	  noise	  in	  data,	  and	  method	  two	  aims	  give	  a	  
more	  consistent	  approach	  to	  classifying	  whether	  a	  product	  is	  bound	  or	  unbound.	  	  
	  
However	  method	  two	  also	  has	  a	  fundamental	  flaw.	  Although	  the	  results	  obtained	  through	  method	  
two	  are	  an	  improvement	  from	  method	  one	  there	  is	  also	  a	  degree	  of	  measurement	  error.	  Method	  
two	  assigns	  all	  the	  garment	  and	  cotton	  fabric	  sections	  as	  bound.	  And	  thus	  does	  not	  take	  into	  account	  
the	  products	  within	  garments	  that	  are	  not	  bound.	  Thus	  wool	  and	  silk	  garments	  that	  had	  no	  quota	  
restriction	  in	  2004	  are	  therefore	  assigned	  a	  100%	  fill	  rate	  in	  this	  study.	  Although	  these	  specific	  



























5. Estimation	  Results:	  
5.1 Results	  for	  Method	  1:	  	  
Results	  Table	  1.1:	  	  
	   Difference	  -­‐	  in	  -­‐	  
difference	  
Diff	  –	  in	  –	  Diff	  	  
Product	  &	  Year	  
Effects	  
	  
Fixed	  Effects	  (product	  by	  
firm)	  
	  
Lnsales	   Coef.	   P>t	   Coef.	   P>t	   Coef.	   P>t	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Post_MFA	   0.2220584***	   0.00	   0.0509146	   0.59	   0.1916514***	   0.00	  
Bound	   0.509891***	   0.00	   0.5401704	   0.22	   (Omitted)	  	   -­‐	  
Diff-­‐in-­‐
Diff	  
-­‐0.0599054	   0.61	   -­‐0.0914135	   -­‐0.99	   -­‐0.0300324	   0.57	  
_cons	   4.427101***	   0.00	   0.6189998	   0.721	   4.707949***	   0.00	  
Note:	  Significance	  Levels	  for	  ALL	  tables:	  *	  10%	  significance,	  **	  5%	  significance,	  ***	  1%	  significance.	  
	  
Method	  one	  produced	  significant	  measurement	  error	  and	  for	  that	  reason	  the	  illustrated	  results	  in	  
table	  one	  are	  not	  consistent	  with	  expectations.	  Despite	  this,	  the	  first	  column	  showing	  specification	  
of	  equation	  one	  (the	  difference	  in	  difference	  approach)	  shows	  positive	  and	  statistically	  significant	  
increases	  in	  sales	  after	  MFA	  removal	  (22.20%)	  compared	  to	  pre	  2005,	  and	  an	  increase	  in	  sales	  of	  
50.898%	  of	  originally	  bound	  products	  compared	  to	  non-­‐bound	  products.	  However	  the	  key	  
coefficient	  is	  the	  basic	  difference	  in	  difference	  that	  shows	  a	  negative	  effect	  on	  sales	  from	  the	  
removal	  of	  the	  quota	  system	  of	  a	  previously	  bound	  product	  after	  2005.	  This	  is	  an	  inconsistent	  and	  
counter	  intuitive	  finding.	  
	  
The	  second	  column	  shows	  the	  difference-­‐in-­‐difference	  specification	  as	  in	  equation	  one,	  
however	  includes	  year	  and	  product	  effects	  in	  order	  to	  control	  for	  time	  effects.	  Once	  again	  
estimation	  provides	  a	  statistically	  insignificant	  and	  unintuitive	  result.	  However	  it	  does	  show	  
increases	  in	  sales	  values	  after	  2005	  compared	  to	  before	  as	  well	  as	  reporting	  surges	  in	  sales	  of	  
previously	  bound	  products	  compared	  to	  unbound	  products.	  
	  
Column	  three	  and	  the	  last	  specification	  of	  the	  fixed	  effects	  (product	  by	  firm),	  sucks	  out	  the	  
time	  invariant	  variable	  of	  the	  bound	  rate	  –	  showing	  that	  the	  bound	  variable	  was	  time	  dependent,	  in	  
doing	  so	  it	  analyzes	  just	  the	  post	  MFA	  removal	  increase	  in	  sales	  of	  19.165%	  compared	  to	  before	  
removal.	  	  
The	  difference-­‐in-­‐difference	  coefficient	  analyzing	  the	  effect	  on	  sales	  of	  a	  bound	  product	  
compared	  to	  an	  unbound,	  post	  2005	  compared	  to	  pre	  2005	  shows	  a	  statistically	  insignificant	  result	  
as	  well	  as	  counter	  intuitive.	  The	  fixed	  effects	  specification	  is	  superior	  despite	  the	  result,	  as	  we	  know	  
that	  by	  eliminating	  the	  time	  dependent	  ‘bound’	  dummy	  the	  effect	  on	  sales	  following	  the	  quota	  
removal	  can	  be	  analyzed	  without	  unobserved	  and	  time	  dependent	  factors	  influencing	  it.	  Thus	  there	  















Results	  Table	  1.2:	  Unit	  value	  effects	  from	  Quota	  Removal	  
	  
	   Diff	  –	  in	  –	  Diff	  	  
Product	  &	  Year	  Effects	  
	  
Fixed	  Effects	  (product	  by	  firm)	  	  
	  
Lnuv	   Coef.	   P>t	   Coef.	   P>t	  
Post_MFA	   0.1180067***	   0.00	   0.1115019***	   0.00	  
Bound	   1.061522	   0.36	   0.000	   -­‐	  
Diff	  -­‐	  in	  -­‐	  Diff	  	   -­‐0.0600181	   0.17	   -­‐0.0524936**	   0.07	  
_cons	   -­‐2.603189***	   0.00	   -­‐2.376349***	   0.00	  
	  
The	  second	  table	  analyzes	  the	  differential	  effect	  on	  prices	  between	  previously	  bound	  products	  
compared	  to	  previously	  unbound	  products	  after	  the	  MFA	  removal.	  	  	  
The	  first	  column	  is	  a	  difference	  –	  in	  –	  difference	  specification	  as	  per	  equation	  one.	  By	  firstly	  
controlling	  for	  time	  invariant,	  product	  specific	  and	  year	  specific	  shocks	  to	  the	  unit	  values	  of	  
products.	  Estimation	  results	  show	  a	  statistically	  significant	  increase	  of	  11.800%	  in	  prices	  after	  the	  
MFA	  removal,	  however	  estimation	  results	  fail	  to	  show	  any	  significant	  price	  decreases	  for	  previously	  
bound	  products.	  As	  well	  as	  not	  providing	  a	  statistically	  significant	  result	  for	  decreases	  in	  prices	  of	  
previously	  bound	  products	  after	  MFA	  removal	  (the	  difference	  in	  difference	  estimator)	  although	  the	  
relationship	  is	  consistent	  with	  expectations.	  
	  
The	  second	  column	  shows	  the	  fixed	  effects	  estimator	  as	  per	  equation	  two.	  By	  eliminating	  
the	  time	  invariant	  bound	  dummy,	  and	  accounting	  for	  unobserved	  time	  variant	  factors,	  the	  fixed	  
effects	  model	  does	  produce	  a	  more	  statistically	  significant	  estimate	  showing	  a	  price	  differential	  
between	  previously	  quota	  bound	  products	  and	  unbound	  products.	  The	  estimate	  shows	  a	  5.250%	  
decrease	  in	  price	  of	  a	  previously	  quota	  bound	  product	  after	  the	  MFA	  quota	  system	  has	  ended.	  And	  
thus	  this	  is	  consistent	  with	  expectations.	  	  
	  
Results	  Table	  1.3:	  robustness	  check	  –	  only	  analyzing	  multi-­‐product	  producing	  firms.	  	  
	  
	  	   Difference	  -­‐	  in	  -­‐	  difference	  
	  	  
Diff	  –	  in	  –	  Diff	  	  
Product	  &	  Year	  Effects	  
	  	  
Fixed	  Effects	  (product	  by	  firm)	  
	  
Lnsales	   Coef.	   P>t	   Coef.	  	   P>t	   Coef.	   P>t	  
Post_MFA	   0.0914575	   0.46	   0.1590914	   1.56	   0.1590914***	   0.00	  
Boundi	   0.3813796**	   0.03	   6.634053	   6.38	   (Omitted)	   -­‐	  
Diff	  	  -­‐	  in	  -­‐	  Diff	  	   0.0000991	   1.00	   0.0000991***	   0.00	   0.0000991	   0.99	  
_cons	   5.078318***	   0.00	   1.043749	   0.15	   5.215344***	   0.00	  
	  
	  
Results	  for	  the	  robustness	  check	  illustrate	  a	  similar	  picture	  to	  that	  of	  the	  first	  specification	  results.	  As	  












worthwhile	  results	  on	  the	  variable	  of	  interest.	  Although	  the	  diff-­‐in-­‐diff	  estimate	  is	  un-­‐useful	  there	  
are	  still	  statistically	  significant	  estimates	  showing	  the	  increase	  in	  sales	  following	  the	  end	  of	  the	  MFA.	  
	  
	  
5.2 Results	  for	  Method	  2:	  
Results	  Table	  2.1:	  The	  effect	  of	  the	  quota	  removal	  on	  sales	  
	  
	  	   	  	  	  	  Basic	  Diff-­‐in-­‐Diff	  
	  	  
Diff	  –	  in	  –	  Diff	  	  
Product	  &	  Year	  Effects	  
	  	  
Fixed	  Effects	  (product	  by	  firm)	  
	  	  
lnSales	   Coeff	   P>t	   Coeff	   P>t	   Coeff	   P>t	  
Post_MFA	  	   0.1992505***	   0.00	   0.2577339***	   0.00	   0.1175324***	   0.00	  
Boundi	   -­‐0.2881055***	   0.00	   -­‐7.607156***	   0.00	   (Omitted)	   -­‐	  
Diff	  	  -­‐	  in	  –	  Diff	   0.0641786	   0.61	   0.2830482***	   0.00	   0.2055733***	   0.00	  
_cons	   4.413065***	   0.00	   7.384012***	   0.00	   4.446544***	   0.00	  
	  
The	  first	  column	  illustrates	  results	  for	  the	  basic	  diff-­‐in-­‐diff	  as	  per	  equation	  two:	  the	  basic	  difference	  
in	  difference	  provides	  an	  intuitive	  and	  statistically	  significant	  result	  of	  increased	  sales	  post	  MFA,	  an	  
estimation	  of	  19.925%,	  compared	  to	  before	  2005.	  However	  the	  garments	  and	  cotton	  fabric	  bound	  
products	  showed	  a	  decrease	  in	  sales	  of	  28.81%	  compared	  to	  the	  unbound	  products.	  Although	  
statistically	  significant	  these	  dummy	  variables	  do	  not	  provide	  worthwhile	  information	  for	  this	  
specification.	  	  
The	  difference	  in	  difference	  estimator,	  shows	  the	  positive	  impact	  on	  sales	  of	  6.417%	  post	  
2005	  of	  originally	  bound	  products,	  compared	  to	  unbound	  products	  before	  2005.	  	  
However	  this	  is	  statistically	  insignificant,	  and	  thus	  there	  is	  a	  need	  to	  control	  for	  product	  
specific	  and	  year	  specific	  shocks	  in	  firm	  sales	  that	  may	  be	  correlated	  with	  the	  removal	  of	  the	  quota.	  
	  	  
This	  is	  shown	  in	  column	  two,	  and	  relates	  to	  equation	  two	  of	  our	  specification.	  Once	  again	  it	  
shows	  significant	  results	  for	  variables	  in	  isolation,	  it	  confirms	  surges	  in	  sales	  of	  25.773%	  post	  MFA	  
removal	  compared	  to	  during	  MFA,	  as	  well	  as	  showing	  statistically	  significant	  differential	  increase	  in	  
sales	  of	  28.304%	  post	  2005.	  
The	  fixed	  effects	  estimation	  is	  found	  in	  column	  three.	  This	  aims	  to	  further	  eliminate	  
unobserved	  time	  variant	  factors	  that	  influence	  sales.	  Significance	  is	  achieved	  by	  sucking	  out	  the	  time	  
invariant	  variable	  of	  the	  dummy	  on	  garments	  and	  cotton	  fabrics.	  Thus	  the	  fixed	  effects	  estimator	  
confirms	  a	  statistically	  significant	  increase	  in	  sales	  after	  2005	  of	  11.753%	  compared	  to	  before,	  while	  
the	  difference	  in	  difference	  effects	  confirm	  a	  statistically	  significant	  increase	  of	  20.557%	  in	  sales,	  of	  
previously	  bound	  cotton	  fabric	  and	  garment	  products	  compared	  to	  other	  T&C	  products	  after	  the	  
MFA	  removal	  compared	  to	  before.	  
	  
Table	  2.1	  essentially	  presents	  the	  stark	  difference	  between	  our	  method	  one	  (table	  1.1)	  and	  method	  
two.	  By	  accounting	  for	  the	  measurement	  error	  from	  quota	  allocation	  the	  estimation	  results	  differ.	  	  












statistically	  significant	  results	  as	  well	  as	  the	  fixed	  effects	  estimation.	  These	  two	  specifications	  under	  
‘method	  2’	  provide	  the	  central	  findings	  of	  this	  paper	  
	  
	  
Table	  2.2:	  The	  effect	  of	  the	  quota	  removal	  on	  unit	  values	  (prices):	  	  
	  
	  	   Diff	  –	  in	  –	  Diff	  	  
Product	  &	  Year	  Effects	  
	  	  
Fixed	  Effects	  (product	  by	  firm)	  
	  	  
lnUnit_Value	   Coef.	   P>t	   Coef.	   P>t	  
Post_MFA	  	   0.1137488***	   0.00	   0.0868141***	   0.00	  
Boundi	   -­‐1.12941	   0.21	   0	   	  -­‐	  
Diff	  	  -­‐	  in	  -­‐	  Diff	   -­‐0.0888773**	   0.07	   -­‐0.0503222	   0.131	  
_cons	   -­‐0.9549124**	   0.04	   -­‐2.400952***	   0.00	  
	   	   	   	   	  
	  
	  
The	  second	  specification	  analyzes	  the	  differential	  effect	  on	  prices	  between	  previously	  bound	  
products	  compared	  to	  previously	  unbound	  products	  after	  the	  MFA	  removal.	  	  By	  once	  again	  
controlling	  for	  time	  invariant,	  product	  specific	  and	  year	  specific	  shocks	  to	  the	  unit	  values	  of	  
products.	  The	  difference-­‐in-­‐difference	  estimate	  confirms	  the	  desired	  relationship	  of	  a	  decrease	  in	  
price	  of	  previously	  bound	  products	  compared	  to	  unbound	  products	  after	  MFA	  quota	  removal.	  	  
The	  first	  column	  indicates	  an	  estimated	  decrease	  of	  8.887%.	  
The	  second	  column	  shows	  the	  fixed	  effects	  specification	  does	  not	  reveal	  statistically	  significant	  




Table	  3:	  Robustness	  check	  for	  multi-­‐product	  firms.	  
	  
	  	   Basic	  Diff-­‐in-­‐Diff	  
	  	  
Diff	  –	  in	  –	  Diff	  	  
Product	  &	  Year	  Effects	  
	  	  




Lnsales	   Coef.	   P>t	   Coef.	   P>t	   Coef.	   P>t	  
Post_MFA	   0.0570764	   0.51	   0.0691526	   0.35	   0.0691526*	   0.06	  
Boundi	   -­‐0.307016**	   0.02	   -­‐3.89441***	   0.00	   (Omitted)	   -­‐	  
Diff	  	  -­‐	  in	  –	  
Diff	  
0.195094	   0.32	   0.1950974	   0.12	   0.1950974***	   0.00	  
_cons	   5.037856***	   0.00	   7.654272***	   0.00	   4.99799***	   0.00	  














Table	  three	  reports	  a	  robustness	  check	  for	  multi-­‐product	  firms	  and	  the	  impact	  the	  quota	  removal	  
had	  on	  sales.	  	  
It	  depicts	  very	  similar	  relationships	  to	  the	  specifications	  previously	  run	  on	  all	  firms.	  	  
The	  first	  column	  -­‐	  The	  difference-­‐in-­‐difference	  estimator	  only	  provides	  a	  significant	  result	  under	  year	  
fixed	  effects	  when	  sucking	  out	  the	  time	  invariant	  variable	  of	  bound	  products	  and	  unbound.	  The	  
results	  for	  this	  particular	  specification	  illustrates	  that	  after	  MFA	  quota	  removal,	  sales	  of	  previously	  
bound	  products	  (garments	  and	  cotton	  fabrics)	  increased	  by	  19.509%	  when	  compared	  to	  when	  the	  
quota	  system	  was	  in	  place.	  This	  is	  consistent	  to	  our	  previous	  estimation	  of	  an	  increase	  in	  sales	  of	  
20.557%.	  	  
The	  third	  column	  showing	  the	  fixed	  effects	  estimation	  as	  per	  equation	  two	  shows	  a	  superior	  and	  
statistically	  significant	  result	  when	  controlling	  for	  unobserved	  time	  variant	  effects.	  The	  final	  fixed	  
effects	  regression	  for	  multi-­‐product	  firms	  emphasizes	  that	  there	  is	  a	  positive	  impact	  on	  sales	  after	  
the	  MFA	  quota	  removal.	  This	  estimate	  of	  19.50%	  is	  the	  most	  valid	  estimation	  result	  as	  it	  controls	  for	  
the	  most	  unobserved	  variation	  and	  thus	  we	  can	  confidently	  conclude	  that	  sales	  of	  previously	  bound	  




6. Conclusion	  	  
A	  structured	  approach	  was	  taken	  to	  analyze	  the	  effect	  that	  trade	  barrier	  removal	  has	  on	  Indian	  
firms.	  A	  simple	  but	  effective	  empirical	  estimation	  is	  employed	  that	  aims	  to	  investigate	  the	  effect	  the	  
removal	  of	  the	  MFA	  quota	  system	  had	  on	  Indian	  firms’	  intensive	  margin.	  Specific	  empirics	  were	  
based	  on	  a	  basic	  difference-­‐	  in	  –	  difference	  estimation	  method,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  fixed	  effects	  model.	  
These	  simple	  specifications	  firstly	  estimated	  the	  differential	  effects	  of	  firm	  sales	  after	  2005	  
compared	  to	  before	  as	  well	  as	  between	  bound	  and	  unbound	  products.	  It	  also	  estimated	  the	  
differential	  effects	  on	  prices	  using	  the	  same	  specifications.	  As	  well	  as	  running	  robustness	  checks	  for	  
multi	  –	  product	  firms.	  Results	  proved	  to	  be	  robust	  with	  the	  superior	  fixed	  effects	  estimations	  
producing	  estimates	  of	  an	  increase	  of	  19.5%	  in	  sales	  of	  previously	  bound	  products	  after	  2005	  
compared	  to	  unbound	  products.	  And	  an	  estimate	  of	  a	  decrease	  in	  the	  price	  of	  previously	  bound	  
goods	  of	  5%	  after	  2005.	  	  
In	  addition	  this	  paper	  makes	  a	  significant	  contribution	  to	  the	  analysis	  and	  compilation	  of	  firm	  level	  
data,	  sourced	  from	  the	  Centre	  for	  Monitoring	  the	  Indian	  Economy	  (CMIE),	  and	  will	  be	  of	  valuable	  


















7. Theory	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Figures	  (a)	  and	  (b):	  The	  Equivalence	  Effect:	  
Equivalence	  of	  quotas	  and	  tariffs	  under	  perfect	  competition.	  	  
Export	  quota	  of	  X*	  imposed	  in	  the	  importing	  market,	  causing	  a	  vertical	  supply	  curve	  in	  the	  Import	  
Market.	  With	  a	  constraint	  on	  the	  amount	  of	  goods	  available	  for	  import,	  essentially	  demand	  outstrips	  
supply	  and	  there	  is	  a	  rise	  in	  prices	  of	  goods	  in	  the	  domestic	  market.	  This	  is	  shown	  by	  an	  increased	  
price	  of	  P1	  in	  the	  domestic	  market.	  Supply	  of	  Y1	  and	  reduced	  demand	  to	  C1.	  There	  would	  be	  an	  
equivalent	  effect	  on	  demand,	  supply	  and	  price	  if	  government	  had	  imposed	  a	  tariff	  equal	  to	  the	  price	  
distorting	  effect	  of	  t	  =	  P1	  –	  P*.	  
(Feenstra,	  	  (Chapter	  8	  :	  4)).	  
Figure	  (c)	  :	  The	  Domestic	  Monopoly	  –	  Imperfect	  Competition.	  	  
With	  a	  fixed	  world	  prices	  of	  P*,	  the	  demand	  curve	  faced	  by	  the	  monopolist	  is	  essentially	  horizontal,	  
and	  the	  profit	  maximizing	  quantity	  is	  YO	  (where	  MR	  =	  MC).	  
This	  is	  the	  same	  quantity	  that	  a	  competitive	  firm	  or	  industry	  would	  produce	  if	  it	  had	  the	  same	  MC	  as	  
the	  monopolist.	  So	  therefore	  free	  trade	  in	  a	  small	  country	  eliminates	  the	  market	  power	  of	  the	  
monopolist	  i.e.	  it	  eliminates	  its	  ability	  to	  restrict	  supply	  and	  raise	  price.	  And	  therefore	  this	  is	  an	  initial	  
source	  of	  gains	  from	  trade.	  	  
If	  a	  tariff	  of	  t	  is	  applied	  to	  imports	  the	  domestic	  monopolist	  can	  charge	  as	  much	  as	  P*	  +	  t	  but	  no	  
more,	  so	  its	  demand	  curve	  is	  now	  horizontal	  at	  that	  price.	  So	  therefore	  its	  MR	  curve	  is	  also	  
horizontal	  at	  that	  price	  of	  P*	  +	  t,	  So	  profit	  maximizing	  quantity	  is	  at	  Y1.	  Consumption	  is	  at	  C1	  and	  
imports	  equal	  :	  M1	  =	  C1	  –	  Y1.	  	  
However	  if	  a	  quota	  is	  applied,	  for	  any	  price	  above	  P*	  the	  fixed	  amount	  of	  M1	  can	  be	  imported.	  And	  
therefore	  the	  demand	  curve	  facing	  the	  monopolist	  is	  the	  initial	  demand	  curve	  D	  less	  the	  amount	  M1.	  
(D	  –	  M1)	  	  
So	  therefore	  unlike	  the	  tariff	  scenario	  the	  monopolist	  retains	  the	  ability	  to	  influence	  the	  domestic	  
price,	  it	  can	  choose	  the	  optimal	  price	  and	  quantity	  along	  D	  –	  M1.	  	  
(Feenstra,	  (Chapter	  8	  :	  9)).	  	  	  
Based	  on	  the	  theoretical	  discussion	  we	  would	  expect	  the	  following	  to	  happen	  within	  the	  Indian	  
textile	  firms	  with	  regards	  to	  product	  choice,	  sales	  and	  prices.	  	  
• From	  the	  theoretical	  discussion	  above,	  we	  would	  expect	  an	  increase	  in	  sales	  following	  the	  
removal	  of	  the	  MFA	  as	  well	  as	  a	  decrease	  in	  the	  prices	  of	  the	  goods	  sold.	  In	  certain	  cases	  this	  
can	  imply	  lower	  quality	  (cheaper)	  goods	  being	  sold.	  	  
• Secondly	  with	  quota	  restrictions	  falling	  away	  there	  will	  be	  an	  increase	  in	  sales	  of	  Indian	  
products.	  Also	  applying	  to	  exports	  from	  India.	  Indian	  firms	  are	  able	  to	  undercut	  U.S	  firms	  
through	  cheaper	  factors	  of	  production	  and	  thus	  consumers	  in	  the	  U.S	  show	  a	  greater	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